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This paper summarizes the effects of deregulation of restrictions on bank entry and expansion on 
the real economy.  The evidence suggests that following state-level deregulation of restrictions 
on branching, state economic growth accelerated.  This better growth performance was 
especially pronounced in the entrepreneurial sector.  In addition to faster growth, macroeconomic 
stability improved with interstate deregulation that allowed that banking system to integrate 
across state lines.  This deregulation reduced the sensitivity of state economies to shocks to their 
own banks’ capital. I.  Introduction 
   In the 1970s, commercial bank faced restrictions on interest rates, both on the deposit 
and lending sides of their business.  They were restricted for the most part to classic financial 
intermediation – deposit taking and lending  –  to the exclusion, for example, of underwriting 
many corporate securities and insurance products.  And, banks were limited in the geographical 
scope of their operations.  No state permitted banks headquartered in other states either to open 
branches or to buy their banks, and many states prohibited or restricted intrastate branching.  
  Today, almost all of these restrictions have been lifted.  Interest rate ceilings on deposits 
were phased out in the early 1980s, state usury laws have been weakened because banks may 
now lend anywhere, limits to banks’ ability to engage in other financial activities have been 
almost completely eliminated, as have restrictions on the geographical scope of banking.  As a 
result, our banking system is now more competitive and more consolidated than ever – both 
vertically and horizontally. 
  This paper focuses on how one dimension of this broad-based deregulation  –  the 
removal of limits on bank entry and expansion  – affected economic performance.  In a nutshell, 
the results suggest that this regulatory change was followed by better performance of the real 
economy.  State economies grew faster and had higher rates of new business formation after this 
deregulation.  At the same time, macroeconomic stability improved.  By opening up markets and 
allowing the banking system to integrate across the nation, deregulation made local economies 
less sensitive to the fortunes of their local banks. 
  Below I explain first how relaxation of geographical restrictions on bank expansion 
proceeded historically, and why our somewhat unusual history of state-level regulation and 
deregulation presents an attractive setting to study how the financial system affects the real 
economy.  I then present the evidence that banking deregulation led to substantial and beneficial 
real effects on our economy.  The findings are important for at least two reasons.  First, they  
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demonstrate the tight link between “Wall Street” and “Main Street.”  Finance is not only affected 
by the fortunes of the industrial sector, but the reverse holds true as well.  This mutual 
dependence highlights the importance of financial regulation not only here in the United States 
but, perhaps even more critically, in emerging economies without a well developed set of 
financial markets and institutions.  Second, the results support the idea that competition and 
financial market openness are beneficial.  This finding would be accepted as non-controversial 
when applied to industrial firms – for most economist, free trade and competition are akin to 
motherhood – but is much less accepted when applied to the financial sector. 
 
II.  Bank Deregulation as an Empirical Laboratory 
  The evolutionary history of banking regulations in the United States offers researchers a 
unique opportunity to study the effects deregulation, particularly those related to restrictions on 
banks’ ability to expand within and across state lines, because they were imposed at the state 
level and because states changed their regulatory restrictions on expansion at different times.  
Although there was some deregulation of branching restrictions in the 1930s, most states either 
prohibited branching altogether (the “unit banking” states) or limited branching into the 1970s.  
At that point, only twelve states allowed unrestricted statewide branching.  Between 1970 and 
1994, however, 38 states deregulated their restrictions on branching.
1 
  In addition to facing branching limitations within the state, until the 1980s cross-state 
ownership of banks was effectively prohibited by states’ application of the Douglas Amendment 
to the 1956 Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act.  This amendment prohibited a BHC from 
acquiring banks outside the state where it was headquartered unless the target bank’s state  
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permitted such acquisitions.  Since states chose to bar such transactions, the amendment 
effectively prevented interstate banking.  Change began in 1978, when Maine passed a law 
allowing entry by out-of-state BHCs if, in return, banks from Maine were allowed to enter those 
states (entry meaning the ability to buy incumbent banks).  No state reciprocated, however, so 
the deregulation process remained stalled until 1982, when Alaska and New York passed laws 
similar to Maine.  State deregulation was nearly complete by 1992, by which time all states but 
Hawaii had passed similar laws. 
  Table 1 outlines the steps taken by each state to relax these restrictions on bank branching 
and on interstate banking.  The first two columns pertain to within-state branching deregulation.  
The first column presents the year in which each state permitted branching by means of  merger 
and acquisition (M&A) only.  With this form of deregulation, an expansion-minded bank could 
enter a new market either by buying an existing bank in that market and folding its operations 
into the acquirer’s existing operations, or by buying individual branches of existing banks.  The 
second column reports the year in which each state first permitted unrestricted branching, 
thereby allowing banks to enter new markets by opening new branches.  In most cases, 
branching by M&A occurred first, then unrestricted branching deregulation occurred soon 
thereafter.  This time clustering makes it hard to isolate the impact of M&A branching from the 
impact of permitting new branches; moreover, it turns out that most banks enter new markets by 
buying existing banks or branches rather than by building new ones.  So, in the empirical 
analysis I will construct a single branching indicator based on the date at which a state first 
permitted branching by M&A.   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
1 While branching was generally restricted, however, banking companies could expand in 
some states by forming multi-bank holding companies (BHCs).  
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  Column three reports the year in which states first entered into an interstate banking 
agreement with other states.  With interstate deregulation, a state opened up the possibility that 
an outside banking organization could acquire its incumbent banks.  This form of deregulation, 
however, did not permit these newly acquired banking assets to be folded into the acquirer’s 
banking operations outside the state.  State-level moves toward interstate banking therefore did 
not lead to interstate branching.  In 1994 though the deregulatory process was completed with 
passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA), federal 
legislation that mandated complete interstate banking as of 1997 and encouraged states to permit 
interstate branching.  IBBEA permitted states to opt out of interstate branching, but only Texas 
and Montana chose to do so.  Most other states did protect their banks by forcing out-of-state 
entrants to buy existing branches rather than open new ones. 
  The staggered timing of state-level moves to deregulate both branching and interstate 
banking restrictions provides an ideal laboratory to explore empirically how these regulatory 
changes affected banking and the real economy.  Because of the cross-state and over-time 
variation in the regulatory status of different states, both unobserved state differences and 
aggregate shocks (and any secular trends) can be fully absorbed with the inclusion of fixed 
effects, while leaving sufficient variation in the regulatory variables to estimate their effects on 
state-level financial and real variables.  Moreover, by using the state as the relevant unit, the 
resulting panel data set is balanced because states do not enter or exit the sample.  Thus, there is 
no need to worry about (or attempt to correct for) survivorship biases that can plague attempts to 
draw inferences from bank-level or firm-level data.
2 
                                                 
 
2These issues are especially important for studies of entry regulations because the competitive 
shakeout that occurs after regulatory change increases the odds that some banks will not survive.  
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  To be concrete, the research method boils down to estimating a regression using state-
year observations with the following structure: 
 
 
  (1)  Yst = "t + $s + (1Branchst + (2Bankst + OtherControlsst + ,st  
 
where s indexes states, t indexes time, Yst is the dependent variable of interest, "t is a year-
specific fixed effect (estimated by including a set of year indicator variables), $s is a state-
specific fixed effect (estimated by including a set of state indicator variables), Branchst is an 
indicator set to one after a state permits branching (by means of merger and acquisition), and 
Bankst is an indicator set to one after a state permits interstate banking.  Thus, the deregulation 
indicators equal one in all state-years following deregulation, and they equal zero in all state-
years prior to deregulation.
3 
Endogenous Deregulation? 
  Before describing the results, it is worth considering briefly why banking regulations 
remained static from the 1930s to the middle of the 1970s, and why they began to change across 
all states from the 1970s to the early 1990s.  Several developments probably contributed.  In the 
mid-1980s, for instance, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency took advantage of a 
clause in the 1864 National Bank Act to allow nationally chartered banks to branch freely in 
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those states where savings institutions (S&Ls and savings banks) did not face branching 
restrictions.  The Comptroller’s action was instrumental in introducing statewide branching in 
several southern states.  Another impetus behind deregulation may have been the rash of bank 
and thrift failures in the 1980s, which increased public awareness of the advantages of large, 
well-diversified banks.  As part of the 1982 Garn-St Germain Act, for example, federal 
legislators amended the Bank Holding Company Act to allow failed banks and thrifts to be 
acquired by any bank holding company, regardless of state laws (Kane, 1996). 
  More broadly, Economides, Hubbard and Palia (1996) show that small banks lobbied 
successfully in the 1930s for both generous deposit insurance and tight limits on branching, 
despite the objections of large banks.  White (1998) shows that the small bank lobby continued 
its success over the subsequent 40 years by gaining increased levels of deposit insurance 
coverage all the way up until 1980 when this limit was last raised (to $100,000).
4  Thus, the 
influence of small banks may explain the relative stability of these regulatory institutions from 
the 1930s through the 1970s. 
  Kroszner and Strahan (1999) suggest that the emergence of new technologies in both 
deposit-taking and lending beginning in the 1970s tipped the balance in the political arena from 
the traditional beneficiaries of geographical restrictions – small banks  –  toward more 
expansion-minded, large banks.  As evidence, we show that deregulation occurred earlier in 
states with fewer small banks, in states where small banks were financially weak, and in states 
with more small and bank-dependent firms.  We also find that a larger insurance industry 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
3These indicator variables are set equal to missing in the year of deregulation.  In addition, we do 
not include two states, Delaware and South Dakota, in any of the analysis because these two states had a 
unique history due to the growth of the credit card business there. 
 
4As of this writing, an increase in FDIC insurance coverage to $130,000 is under debate in 
Congress at the urging of advocacy groups representing the interests of small, community banks.  
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delayed deregulation when banks could compete in the sale of insurance products.  Interest group 
factors related to the relative strength of potential winners (large banks and small firms) and 
losers (small banks and the rival insurance firms) therefore can explain the timing of branching 
deregulation across states.
5 
  Given these political economy explanations for banking reform, can we interpret the 
results from equation (1)?  The results in Kroszner and Strahan (1999) suggest that aggregate 
forces such as technological change affected all financial services firms and created increasingly 
strong pressures for regulatory regime change; however, interest group factors determined the 
exact timing of when a particular state changed its laws.  Thus, a cross-state comparison of state 
growth or business cycle volatility might be misleading, or at least difficult to interpret.  For 
example, consider comparing states in a single year, say 1987.  If states permitting interstate 
banking had more large banks than states that did not yet permit interstate banking, it could be 
that regulation led to structural changes favoring large banks (i.e. regulation caused the structural 
change), or it could be that states with more large banks deregulated before states with fewer 
large banks (i.e. regulation was caused by the cross-state differences in structure). 
  The estimators reported here, however, are not likely to be affected by the political 
economy factors.  By including the state fixed effects in the model ($s), all of the cross-sectional 
variation (such as when a state deregulates) gets removed; coefficients are driven by changes in 
variables after a state alters its regulations.  Persistent differences across states (e.g. large-bank 
dominated states vs. small-bank dominated states) do not affect the results.  Instead, we look at 
how a state’s banking structure changes after it deregulates, on how its growth performance 
                                                 
 
5We also find that the same interest group variables also can explain the voting patterns 
of legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives on interstate banking deregulation and deposit 
insurance reform (See Kroszner and Strahan, 2000).    
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changes relative to its level before deregulation, and on how the volatility of its business cycle 
changes, again relative to its volatility prior to regulatory change. 
 
III.  How Banking Changed after Deregulation 
  We can only expect deregulation to have had large effects on the real economy if there 
were important changes in the structure and efficiency of the banking industry resulting from the 
reforms.  To summarize briefly the key changes, relaxing restrictions on bank expansion led to 
larger banks operating across a wider geographical area.  Increases in local market concentration, 
however, did not occur.  This makes sense because the restrictions on branching and interstate 
banking generally did not apply to local markets, with the exception of a few “unit banking” 
states that did not permit branching in any form.  Thus, deregulation led banks to enter new 
markets, but it did not spur banks to consolidate within a local market.
6 
  Table 2 documents very briefly the magnitude of some of these changes.  Here, I report 
the estimated coefficients on the within-state branching indicator (Branchst) and the interstate 
banking indicator (Bankst) from the fixed effects model described in equation (1) above.  In 
column (1), the dependent variable equals the acquisition rate in a state-year, defined as the total 
dollar value of assets in banks acquired during the state-year, divided by total banking assets in 
the state at the beginning of the year.
7  The results suggest, as expected, that acquisitions 
increased sharply following interstate banking deregulation.  The coefficient implies that the 
annual acquisition rate rose by 1.64 percentage points after interstate reform -- quite a large jump 
                                                 
 
6For a comprehensive survey of the literature on financial consolidation, see Berger, Demsetz and 
Strahan (1999). 
 
7An “acquisition” here occurs when ownership of banking assets changes.  So, if a bank holding 
company buys a bank, or if two unaffiliated banks merge, both would contribute to total assets in  
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relative to the unconditional mean of 2.77 percent.  In contrast, there was no significant increase 
in bank acquisitions following branching deregulation.  Banks tended to expand by purchasing 
branches of existing banks after branching reform rather than by acquiring all of the branches 
and other assets of whole banks, so the acquisition rate of whole banks did not rise (for details, 
see Stiroh and Strahan, forthcoming). 
  The second column of Table 2 shows that local market concentration did not increase 
following deregulation despite the increased acquisition activity; if anything, there was a slight 
drop following interstate banking reform.
8  Local market concentration equals the deposit 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI), calculated as the deposit-weighted average of the HHI 
indexes of the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in a state/year.  The HHI for each local 
market is defined as the sum of squared market shares, where market shares are based on branch-
level deposit data from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits dataset.  To illustrate how this variable 
is computed, consider a bank (or banking company) that owned 10 branches within an MSA.  
This bank’s market share (measured in percentage terms) would equal the sum of all of its 
deposits in those 10 branches, divided by the total deposits held in by all bank branches within 
that MSA, times 100.  For a market with a single bank owning all of the branches, the HHI 
would equal 10,000, whereas in a perfectly atomistic market the HHI would approach zero. 
  The last three columns of Table 2 show that the market share of small banks declined 
following both branching and interstate banking reform.  The declines were most pronounced 
following branching deregulation.  For example, the share of assets held by banks with less than 
$50 million in assets (in 1994 dollars) fell by 1.6 percentage points (relative to a mean of 8.9 
                                                                                                                                                             
acquisitions.  But if two banks owned by the same holding company merged, these assets would not be 
counted. 
 
8Concentration at the state or national levels has increased substantially, however, in part because 
of these regulatory changes.  
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percent), the share of assets held by banks with assets between $50 and $100 million fell by 2.0 
percentage points (relative to a mean of 10.3 percent), and the share held by banks with assets 
between $100 and $500 million fell by 2.2 percentage points (relative to a mean of 23.2 percent).  
After interstate banking the share of the smallest banks declined, while the share of other banks 
did not change significantly. 
  Did these structural changes cause meaningful changes in the efficiency of a state’s 
banking industry?  In earlier research, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) report that the banking 
industry became significantly more efficient following reform.  They find that non-interest costs 
fell, that wages fell, and that loan losses fell after states deregulated branching.  These cost 
reductions led, in turn, to lower prices on loans (although not on deposits).  The mechanism for 
this better performance seems to be changes in the market shares of banks following 
deregulation.  Prior to regulatory reform, well-run banks faced binding constraints on the 
markets in which they could operate.  When these constraints were lifted, however, assets moved 
toward the better run banks as they gained the opportunity to acquire market share.
9 
  The beneficial dynamic effects of competition following deregulation can be seen 
graphically in three figures reported below.
10   In Figure 1, we simply plot the correlation 
between a bank’s profit rate (return on equity) and its subsequent asset growth.  We find that this 
correlation is low during the late 1970s, when the better banks were constrained by regulations, 
then rose sharply during the period of regulatory change – the period when better banks were 
gobbling up market share – then fell back during the beginning of the 1990s.  The figure 
illustrates, somewhat crudely, the dynamic effects of deregulation.   
                                                 
 
9Hubbard and Palia (1995) also show that management compensation became more sensitive to 
performance after deregulation.  
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  Figures 2 and 3 show the outcome of these dynamics.  Here, we plot the average market 
share of banks with above-median profits, averaged across states, after first separating states into 
three groups: states that have permitted branching since the 1930s or before (12 states); states 
that limited branching (23 states), and the “unit banking” states that did not permit any form of 
branching (16 states).  The figures illustrate the detrimental effects of these constraining 
regulations.  For example, in unit banking states, the higher-profit banks typically held 50 
percent or less of the assets in a state; after those states relaxed their regulations, however, these 
better banks’ share rose to 65 to 75 percent of the state’s assets.  States that limited but did not 
prohibit branching experienced qualitatively similar effects following deregulation, although 
these effects were somewhat smaller. 
 
IV.  The Real Effects of Deregulation 
  Did the beneficial changes in banking have quantitatively important effects on the real 
economy?  The answer to this question is important not only for helping us gain an 
understanding of what has happened in the United States, but also for considering how banking 
systems across the world ought to be structured and regulated.  In recent years, a growing 
number of researchers have studied how different financial regulatory regimes across countries 
affected financial stability and economic performance.  For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) test how differences in financial development and banking 
structure affected growth across different industries.  Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Min (1999) 
find that countries open to foreign entry have had better performing banks.  More recently, Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2002) document how various dimensions of banking laws and regulations – 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
10These figures are taken from Stiroh and Strahan (forthcoming).  
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e.g. restrictions on bank activities, restrictions on entry, capital adequacy regulations, deposit 
insurance, supervision and regulation of banks, and government ownership of banks – vary 
across the world and relate these differences to measures of economic performance and stability.  
  While the cross-country approach has much to teach us, one of the difficulties inherent in 
such studies is the fact that many kinds of policy regimes tend to go together.  For example, 
Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2001) find that government ownership of banks tends to 
occur in countries with substantial corruption and poor long-run growth performance.  Similarly, 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) find that entry regulations also tend to 
be most prevalent in countries with corrupt political institutions.  Thus, it becomes difficult in 
cross-country studies to determine what specific factor matters; for example, is entry regulation 
bad or does it simply proxy for other sorts of government constraints that can only be overcome 
through bribery? 
  As noted above, our focus is on the U.S. experience; the relative homogeneity in the 
economic and legal infrastructure across states presents a strong advantage from an empirical 
standpoint because the many “invisible” barriers to effective contracting and economic 
performance are either not present or do not vary substantially across states.  Having said that, 
the hope of this researcher is that the conclusions drawn for the U.S. states will carry over to 
other environments such as emerging economies.  I will focus specifically on three questions.  
First, what were the effects of banking reform on states’ growth performance?  Second, what 
were the effects of reform on entrepreneurial activity?  Third, how did reform affect state-level 
business cycle stability? 
Growth Effects 
  In the early Twentieth Century, Joseph Schumpeter (1969) argued that efficient financial 
systems promote innovations; hence, better finance leads to faster growth.  On the other hand,  
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Joan Robinson (1952) believed that the causality was reversed; economies with good growth 
prospects develop institutions to provide the funds necessary to support those good prospects.  In 
other words, the economy leads and finance follows.  Recent theoretical developments have 
fleshed out two potential causal links from financial systems to growth.  Financial markets can 
matter either by affecting the volume of savings available to finance investment or by increasing 
the productivity (or quality) of that investment.  These theories show that an improvement in 
financial market efficiency can act as a lubricant to the engine of economic growth, allowing that 
engine to run faster. 
  Empirical research in recent years has increasingly provided support for the 
Schumpterian view that financial market development can play an important causal role in 
driving long-run growth.  For example, King and Levine (1993) demonstrated that the size and 
depth of an economy's financial system is positively correlated with its future growth in per-
capita, real income.  While this evidence is suggestive, it can not rule out the possibility that 
financial development and growth are simultaneously driven by a common factor not controlled 
in the empirical analysis.  Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) attempt 
to answer this criticism by exploiting cross-industry differences in financial dependence.  They 
show that in countries with well-developed financial markets, industries that require more 
external finance grow faster than “cash cow” industries that can finance investment with 
internally generated funds.  Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) attempt to establish a causal link 
from finance to growth by using pre-existing legal differences across countries as instruments for 
the development of the banking system; they show that the exogenous component of banking 
development is positively related to growth performance. 
  Another way to establish that better finance (or, specifically, better banking) can lead to 
faster growth is to find policy changes that lead to more efficient finance (banking) and see how  
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the economy responds.  In earlier work, Jith Jayaratne and I did just this.
11  We showed that 
improvements in the financial markets can spur faster economic growth by studying state-level 
branch banking deregulation.  Using data from 1972 to 1992, we estimated the change in 
economic performance before and after deregulation and found that annual growth rates 
accelerated by one-half to one percentage point.  In that study, we worked hard to rule out other 
interpretations of the finding.  For example, we showed that states did not deregulate their 
economies in anticipation of future good growth prospects.  We also found no other concomitant 
policy changes that could account for the result, and no consistent political changes, such as a 
change in the party controlling the state government, around the time of deregulation. 
  Below, I re-estimate this growth model using a slightly different sample period (1976 to 
1996) and including some additional control variables.  Before turning to the results, Table 3 
reports summary statistics for the growth measure, equal to the real annual growth rate in per-
capita state-level personal income.
12  The personal income data are reported by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and converted to constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index.  Over the 
sample period, real personal income grew at an annual rate of slightly less than 1.5 percent.  The 
standard deviation of the growth rates equals 2.79 percent, with a minimum of about -15 percent 
in North Dakota in 1980, and a maximum of about +17 percent, again in North Dakota in 1978.  
Overall there is clearly more variability in year-to-year growth rates for small states like North 
Dakota, but in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) we were careful to rule out the possibility that the 
                                                 
 
11More recently, Collender and Shaffer (2001) explore how other aspects of banking structure 
affect economic growth. 
 
12In our earlier work, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) also considered the growth in gross 
state product, which treats income from capital in a slightly different way from the personal 
income series.  The results, however, were very similar across these two dependent variables.  
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growth increases were driven by a few of these small states.  In the interest of brevity, I will not 
report these tests here.
13 
  Table 4 reports the results of the growth regressions, which include the two banking 
reform indicator variables, the state and time fixed effects, and a set of variables controlling for 
the share of employment in each state coming from eight one-digit SIC industries.  These share 
variables account for the possibility that different sectors exhibit different levels of average 
growth.
14   
  The results in column (1) suggest that average growth accelerated by about 0.56 
percentage points following branching reform; following interstate banking reform the point 
estimate is only slightly lower (0.48 percentage points), but it loses statistical significance.
15  
Column (2) tests whether these growth effects were long lasting or just temporary surges 
following the regulatory change.  Here, I add an indicator variable equal to one starting five 
years after branching reform.  If the growth effects were temporary, this additional indicator 
would have negative and statistically significant coefficient.  (The long-run effect being 
estimated by the sum of the two coefficients.)  Since this additional variable does not enter the 
regression with a significant effect, the evidence suggests that the growth effects are permanent.  
                                                 
 
13Specifically, we showed that the results remain significant using a weighted least squares 
model, where the weights were proportional to state size.  In addition, we showed that among the 35 
states that deregulated their branching restrictions after 1972, all but 6 experienced an increase in growth 
after the regulatory changes relative to before.  
 
14In the regressions the shares sum to one, so one of the eight groups must be omitted.  In all 
regressions, the omitted category is the share of employment in the government sector.  Hence, all of the 
coefficients measure the effect of increasing the employment share in the sector relative to the 
government sector. 
 
15Because most states permitted interstate banking during the middle of the 1980s, there is much 
less variation to exploit in the regressions once state and year fixed effects are included.  Hence, the 
standard error of the interstate banking indicator tends to be larger than the standard error on the 
branching reform indicator.  
  17
Of course, the amount of time that has elapsed since the end of the deregulatory phase has not 
been long – less than ten years in this data set – so these conclusions must be made cautiously. 
  In the last two columns of Table 4, I introduce the employment share variables.  These 
results suggest that mining, construction, manufacturing and perhaps transportation are 
associated with relatively faster growth than the other sectors.  Most important for the purposes 
here, however, is that the conclusions remain the same.  The effect of branching deregulation 
gets somewhat larger when the share variables are added to the model.  Moreover, the indicator 
equal to one during the years starting five years after reform becomes positive, although as 
before we can not reject the hypothesis that its coefficient equals zero. 
Effects on Entrepreneurs 
  The results so far suggest that growth accelerated after deregulation.  But following the 
logic of Rajan and Zingales, just as cash-constrained firms benefited most from financial 
development, bank-dependent firms ought to have benefited the most from the banking 
deregulation and associated improvements in finance.  Entrepreneurs or potential entrepreneurs 
are likely to be highly dependent on banks and other financial markets because they have not had 
the opportunity (yet) to generate cash flow that can support investment.  Indeed, Schumpeter 
himself emphasized the role of financial markets in getting funds to young firms as a key channel 
through which finance can affect long-run growth.  To test this idea, I now explore how the level 
and growth in new business formation changes following banking reform.
16 
  To measure business formation, I use new business incorporations in each state and year 
from 1976 to 1996.  This series comes from the individual states, as reported and compiled by 
Dun & Bradstreet.  Business incorporations is not a perfect measure of the rate of business  
  18
formation in a state, but it offers the best proxy available that is compiled on a consistent basis 
over a relatively long period.  Dun & Bradstreet also report a series on business “starts” that is an 
offshoot of their credit database.  Since this series only goes back to 1985, it is not helpful in 
exploring how the changes in banking that began in the middle of the 1970s affected 
entrepreneurship and business formation.
17  Nevertheless, the starts data can help verify that 
business incorporations track closely the rate of business formation in a state.  It turns out that 
new incorporations per capita and business starts per capita are consistently positively correlated 
with each other; the cross-state correlation ranged from a low of 0.58 in 1994 to a high of 0.72 in 
1988.  There is one important exception, however.  The number of incorporations in Delaware is 
about 20 times the average number of incorporations in the other states (per capita), while the 
number of starts in Delaware is very close to the average.  This difference reflects favorable legal 
treatment of incorporations in that state.  In addition, measures of banking structure in both 
Delaware and South Dakota are skewed by the presence of credit card banks in those states.  We 
therefore drop both of these states from all of our regressions. 
  As a further check on the data, incorporations per capita and starts per capita can be 
compared with the number of new establishments per capita, which is available from the Small 
Business Administration starting in 1989.
18  An establishment is not a firm; rather, it is an 
economic unit that employs people, such as a plant, a factory, or a restaurant.  Nevertheless, we 
think that the number of new establishments ought to be highly correlated with the economic 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
16In an earlier paper I explore how differences in banking structure across states affects new 
business formation.  See Black and Strahan (2002). 
 
17Moreover, the starts series depends on a firm’s actively seeking to raise funds because it is 
based on the D&B credit database. 
 
18Again, since the new establishments series only goes back to 1989, it is not useful in exploring 
the effects of banking deregulation, which was nearing completion by this time.  
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quantity that we are trying to observe – the rate of creation of new businesses.  Again, it is highly 
correlated with both incorporations and starts.  From 1989 to 1994, the cross-state correlation 
between incorporations and new establishments ranges from 0.52 to 0.57, and cross-state 
correlation between starts and new establishments ranges from 0.41 to 0.65.  Thus, new 
incorporations in a state seem to capture new business formation. 
  Table 3 reports summary statistics for both the level of new incorporations per capita and 
for its annual growth rate.  In a typical state and year, there are about 2.5 new incorporations 
formed for every 1000 people living in a state.  The mean growth rate is 2.06 percent per year, 
slightly higher than the growth in real per-capita income.  Notice that the variation in the growth 
of new incorporations is about four times higher than the variation of overall income. 
  Table 5 reports how entrepreneurial activity changed following banking deregulation 
using the new incorporations data.  (Note that in the levels regression, I use the logarithm of the 
rate of new businesses per capita so that the coefficient may be interpreted in percentage terms.)  
Consistent with the Schumpterian logic, both the level and growth of entrepreneurial activity 
increased following banking deregulation.  The regression coefficients suggest, for example, that 
the annual level of new incorporations per-capita increased by 9.8 percent after branching 
deregulation, and by 5.7 percent after interstate banking reform (column 2).  In the specifications 
using the growth rate, the increase only occurred following deregulation of branching.  Thus, the 
effects on entrepreneurial activity of branching deregulation appear to be larger and more 
persistent than the effects of interstate banking, consistent with the effects of the two reforms on 
personal income growth.  It is also worth noting that the magnitude of the increase in the growth 
of new incorporations is substantially larger than the increase in personal income growth 
following reform, although the standard errors are also substantially larger due to the greater 
variation in this series.  
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Business Cycle Effects 
  The evidence so far points to substantial benefits of opening up banking markets to 
potential entry and greater competition, for entrepreneurs looking to start businesses and, perhaps 
through their efforts, to faster overall economic growth.  Cross country evidence is beginning to 
emerge suggesting that opening up financial markets to foreign entry can also create benefits 
associated with macroeconomic stability (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2002).  There is some 
evidence from studies at the bank level, however, that risk-taking may increase with the 
reductions in franchise value that come following banking deregulation (Keeley, 1990, Demsetz, 
Saidenberg and Strahan, 1996, Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000, Bergstresser, 2001). 
  How did banking reform in the U.S. affect macroeconomic stability?  In a recent paper, 
Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2002) analyze this question from both a theoretical and an empirical 
standpoint.  We show first that following interstate banking deregulation in the United States, the 
banking system became substantially better integrated nationally.  Prior to deregulation, the U.S. 
had a balkanized system composed effectively of 50 little banking systems, one for each state.  
After interstate deregulation, however, an average of about 60 percent of a state’s banking assets 
were owned by a multi-state (or, sometimes multinational) banking company.   The theoretical 
effect of this banking integration on business cycles, however, is ambiguous.  In Morgan et al, 
we start with a banking model in which bankers can prevent moral hazard—by monitoring 
firms—and they can commit moral hazard—by neglecting to monitor.  These hazards make the 
equilibrium rate of investment in the economy depend on the level of firm collateral and bank 
capital; these state variables give firms and bankers a stake in future investment outcomes, but 
shocks to either variable cause equilibrium investment to fall, i.e., collateral crunches and bank 
capital crunches are both contractionary.    
  21
  We then show how integration of banking – that is, linking up the banking systems of 
two formerly separate economies – changes the effects of these two kinds of shocks.  It turns out 
that both collateral and capital shocks remain contractionary after integration, but their 
magnitudes change: bank capital shocks become less important after integration, but the effects 
of collateral shocks gets bigger.  The intuition for this result is straightforward and general.  A 
banking company that is diversified across two economies can import capital if lending 
opportunities in one economy are strong relative to the availability of local bank capital.  In 
contrast, a collateral shock in one economy will lead the integrated bank to export their capital 
and lending, thus worsening the resulting downturn. 
  Table 6 below quantifies empirically how both branching and interstate banking 
deregulation affected the magnitude of state business cycles.  The dependent variable in these 
regressions equals the absolute value of the residuals from the personal income growth 
regressions (Table 4, columns 1 and 3), and the growth in new incorporations regressions (Table 
5, columns 3 and 4).  Thus, the dependent variables in Table 6 can be thought of as the 
magnitude of the deviation from expected growth in state personal income and new businesses, 
conditional on the employment shares in a state, the state’s average growth rate (the state fixed 
effect), and shocks to the U.S. economy as a whole (the year fixed effects). 
  The results suggest that overall state-level business cycle volatility fell after interstate 
banking and the associated financial integration.  The coefficients suggest a decline of 0.31 to 
0.47 percentage points, which is large relative to the unconditional mean of 1.26 percent 
(columns 1 and 2).  The effects of branching deregulation are not significant, although this 
should perhaps not be too surprising because branching deregulation allowed integration within a  
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state rather than across state lines.
19  The results for the volatility of the growth of new 
incorporations also point in the same direction – toward less volatility following deregulation – 
although the coefficients on both deregulation indicators are not significant at conventional 
levels (columns 3 and 4). 
  The theoretical analysis suggests that the explanation for better macroeconomic stability 
following deregulation is better insulation of a state’s economy against shocks to its own banking 
system.  In a disintegrated banking system, like the one we had in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
shocks to bank capital lead to reductions in lending, thereby worsening the downturn.  In 
contrast, with integration a state can import bank capital from abroad (i.e. from other states) 
when its banks are down.  If this explanation really holds, then the correlation between economic 
performance and banking performance ought to weaken with deregulation and integration. 
  Table 7 puts this notion to the test by adding the growth rate of local bank capital to the 
personal income and incorporations growth regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5, along with 
interactions between bank capital growth and the deregulation indicator variables.  The results 
provide strong support for the idea that interstate banking deregulation severed the link between 
local economic performance and the performance of local banks.
20  According to the estimated 
coefficients, a 10 percentage point reduction in the growth of bank capital held by local banks 
would be associated with a decline in personal income growth of 1.2 to 1.4 percent prior to 
interstate banking reform.  After reform, however, this correlation becomes indistinguishable 
(statistically) from zero (columns 1 and 2). 
                                                 
 
19Perhaps a better test of the potential stabilizing effects of branching reform would be to use 
regional economic performance.  Integration of banks within a state might help localities share risks just 
as integration across state lines help states share risks. 
 
20Local banks here means banks headquartered within the state.  
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  Table 7 also shows that the link between local bank capital and the growth of new 
incorporations is much stronger prior to deregulation, compared with its link with overall income 
growth, consistent with the premise that banks are especially important for small and young 
firms.  The regression coefficients, for instance, suggest that a 10 percentage point reduction in 
the growth of local bank capital would be associated with a decline in the growth rate of new 
incorporations of 4.5 to 5.4 percent, again prior to interstate banking reform.  After reform, 
however, this correlation also becomes indistinguishable (statistically) from zero (columns 3 and 
4).  So, integration has salutary effects on business cycles by insulating the local economy from 
the ups and downs of the local banking system.  Of course, the kind of cross state integration that 
we experienced following interstate deregulation would not be expected to insulate states to 
shocks to all banks in the United States. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
  Banking deregulation of restrictions on branching and interstate banking lifted a set of 
constraints that had prevented better-run banks from gaining ground over their less efficient 
rivals.  Big changes in the banking industry followed deregulation: many acquisitions and 
consolidation, integration across state lines, and a decline in the market share of small banks.  
These changes allowed banks to offer better services to their customers at lower prices.  As a 
result, the real economy – “Main Street” as it were – seems to have benefited.  Overall economic 
growth accelerated following deregulation, and this faster growth seems to have been 
concentrated among new businesses.  Sometimes we think that higher returns necessarily bring 
higher risk.  But in the case of banking deregulation, volatility of the economy declined as 
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Year of State-Level Deregulation of Restrictions on Geographical Expansion 
State 
Intrastate branching  
via M&A 
Unrestricted intrastate 
 branching permitted  
Interstate banking 
 permitted 
Alabama  1981  1990  1987 
Alaska  <1970  <1970  1982 
Arizona  <1970  <1970  1986 
Arkansas  1994  **  1989 
California  <1970  <1970  1987 
Colorado  1991  **  1988 
Connecticut  1980  1988  1983 
Delaware  <1970  <1970  1988 
DC  <1970  <1970  1985 
Florida  1988  1988  1985 
Georgia  1983  **  1985 
Hawaii  1986  1986  ** 
Idaho  <1970  <1970  1985 
Illinois  1988  1993  1986 
Indiana  1989  1991  1986 
Iowa  **  **  1991 
Kansas  1987  1990  1992 
Kentucky  1990  **  1984 
Louisiana  1988  1988  1987 
Maine  1975  1975  1978 
Maryland  <1970  <1970  1985 
Massachusetts  1984  1984  1983 
Michigan  1987  1988  1986 
Minnesota  1993  **  1986 
Mississippi  1986  1989  1988 
Missouri  1990  1990  1986 
Montana  1990  **  1993 
Nebraska  1985  **  1990 
Nevada  <1970  <1970  1985 
New Hampshire  1987  1987  1987 
New Jersey  1977  **  1986 
New Mexico  1991  1991  1989 
New York  1976  1976  1982 
North Carolina  <1970  <1970  1985 
North Dakota  1987  **  1991 
Ohio  1979  1989  1985 
Oklahoma  1988  **  1987 
Oregon  1985  1985  1986 
Pennsylvania  1982  1990  1986 
Rhode Island  <1970  <1970  1984 
South Carolina  <1970  <1970  1986 
South Dakota  <1970  <1970  1988 
Tennessee  1985  1990  1985 
Texas  1988  1988  1987 
Utah  1981  1981  1984 
Vermont  1970  1970  1988 
Virginia  1978  1987  1985 
Washington  1985  1985  1987 
West Virginia  1987  1987  1988 
Wisconsin  1990  1990  1987 
Wyoming  1988  **  1987 
** States not yet fully deregulated by 1996.  Sources: Amel (1993) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999).  
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Table 2 
Structural Changes in the Banking Industry Following Deregulation 
(Standard errors in Parenthesis) 
      Share of Assets in Banks with Assets: 










$50 to $100 
Million 
 
$100 to $500 
Million 















































The acquisition rate is the dollar value of assets acquired during the state-year divided by beginning of period assets 
in the state-year.  The local deposit HHI is the sum of squared market shares for all banking organizations operating 
within a local market, defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  For states with multiple MSAs, we average 
the HHI across MSAs within the state weighted by the amount of deposits in the MSA.  The model is estimated 
using a fixed effects model with both year and state effects.  The year of deregulation is dropped.  Also, South 
Dakota and Delaware are dropped.  *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics for State-Level Characteristics 




Real per-capita income growth  0.0144  0.0279 
New Incorporations per Capita  2.50  1.41 
Growth in New Incorporations per Capita  0.0206  0.1093 
Volatility of Real per-capita growth  0.0126  0.0138 
Volatility of Growth in New Incorporations  0.0656  0.0732 
Growth in bank capital  0.0897  0.0842 
Share of employment in mining  0.0128  0.0177 
Share of employment in construction  0.0478  0.0146 
Share of employment in manufacturing  0.1946  0.1124 
Share of employment in transportation  0.0549  0.0119 
Share of employment in trade  0.2288  0.0377 
Share of employment in finance  0.0533  0.0131 
Share of employment in services  0.2192  0.0600 
These statistics are calculated using state-year observations.  All data except bank capital growth are from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.  Bank capital growth equals the change in all capital 
at banks headquartered in a given state-year, from the Reports of Income and Condition.  
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Table 4 
Panel Regression of State Growth in Real, Per-Capita Income on Banking Deregulation 
and Employment Share Variables 
(Standard errors in Parentheses) 
  Growth in Real Per-Capita State Income 








Indicator for 5+ Years after 
Branching 
-  -0.0026 
(0.0024) 
-  0.0001 
(0.0025) 








Share of employment in 
mining 




Share of employment in 
construction 




Share of employment in 
manufacturing 




Share of employment in 
transportation 








Share of employment in 
finance 




Share of employment in 
services 















These regressions are estimated using a fixed effects model with both year and state effects.  The year of 
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Table 5 
Panel Regression of the Level and Growth in New Incorporations on Banking 
Deregulation and Employment Share Variables 
(Standard errors in Parentheses) 
  Log of New Incorporations 
per Capita 
Growth in New 
Incorporations per Capita 
















Share of employment in 
mining 
- 
   
6.30* 
(0.92) 
-  0.75 
(0.75)  
Share of employment in 
construction 
-  9.59* 
(0.70) 
-  0.42 
(0.63) 
Share of employment in 
manufacturing 
-  2.89* 
(0.69) 
-  0.52 
(0.57) 
Share of employment in 
transportation 
-  6.00* 
(1.99) 
-  1.41 
(1.59) 
Share of employment in trade  -  6.11* 
(1.03) 
-  0.09 
(0.83) 
Share of employment in 
finance 
-  6.04* 
(1.98) 
-  -2.87* 
(1.58) 
Share of employment in 
services 
-  2.68* 
(0.82) 













These regressions are estimated using a fixed effects model with both year and state effects.  The year of 




Panel Regression of Volatility of Growth in Real, Per-Capita Income and New 
Incorporations on Banking Deregulation and Employment Share Variables 
(Standard errors in Parentheses) 
  Volatility in Growth in Real 
Per-Capita State Income 
Volatility in Growth in New 
Incorporations Per-Capita 
















Share of employment in 
mining 
-  0.01 
(0.08) 
-  1.86* 
(0.48) 
Share of employment in 
construction 
-  0.20* 
(0.06) 
-  0.25 
(0.41) 
Share of employment in 
manufacturing 
-  -0.01 
(0.06) 
-  0.24 
(0.36) 
Share of employment in 
transportation 
-  0.02 
(0.17) 
-  -2.24* 
(1.02) 
Share of employment in trade  -  0.08 
(0.09) 
-  0.27 
(0.53) 
Share of employment in 
finance 
-  0.20 
(0.17) 
-  1.35 
(1.01) 
Share of employment in 
services 
-  0.07 
(0.07) 













The volatility equals the absolute deviation in the growth rate from its expected value; that is, the absolute value of 
the residuals from the models reported in Tables 4 and 5.  These regressions are estimated using a fixed effects 
model with both year and state effects.  The year of deregulation is dropped.  Also, South Dakota and Delaware are 
dropped.  *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  
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Table 7 
Panel Regression of Growth Variables on Banking Deregulation, Bank Capital Growth, 
and Employment Share Variables 
(Standard errors in Parentheses) 
  Growth in Real Per-Capita 
State Income 
Growth in New 
Incorporations per Capita 












































Employment Share Variables 
Included? 












These regressions are estimated using a fixed effects model with both year and state effects.  The year of 
deregulation is dropped.  Also, South Dakota and Delaware are dropped.  *Statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level.  Sample ends in 1994 because the capital growth variable can not be constructed at the state level accurately 
after than time.  
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Note: Plot of the Spearman rank correlation for each year between a bank's ROE in year t-1 (normalized relative to the economy average), and 






Figure 2: Market Share of High-ROE Banks:


















Notes: Each line represents the market share of banks with above-median ROE, averaged across each type of state.  If there are 
fewer than 10 states for a particular type in a given year, we do not report the result.
Figure 3: Market Share of High-ROE Banks:















Pre Deregulation Limit Branching,
 Post Deregulation
Notes: Each line represents the market share of banks with above-median ROE, averaged across each type of state.  If there are fewer 
than 10 states for a particular type in a given year, we do not report the result.